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the design and operation of AUVs. Yet, the subject has received little attention in the
open literature, an exception being an insightful qualitative account of mission-level
reliability in the REMUS AUV [1].
For three key reasons, achieving operational reliability has always taken centre stage
within the Autosub AUV project. First, with only one vehicle to serve as prototype,
demonstrator and operational platform the onus was on the development team to design
and construct a robust and dependable vehicle from the outset. Second, Autosub's prime
purpose is to undertake science missions; marine scientists need to be convinced that the
vehicle can be relied upon to deliver their data. Users naturally apply a credibility
threshold to new technology, and an important factor in crossing that threshold is
demonstrating reliable operation time after time, without incurring excessive engineering
downtime. Third, the AUV needs to demonstrate that it provides value for money to
funding agencies and users. Consequently, its short-term operational record and long-
term likely working life are important issues. It is perhaps inevitable that any autonomous
vehicle may be lost before the end of its useful life, but with care, good design and
operational practice the working life of the vehicle should be long and productive.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 outlines how Autosub was designed
with reliability in mind and how operational practice complements that design
philosophy. Section 3 identifies, quantifies and classifies the faults that have occurred
during four years of use on 240 missions. Section 4 moves on from discussing faults and
provides quantitative estimates of the reliability of the vehicle and the probability of loss.
The paper concludes with a discussion on the lessons learnt that have most bearing on the
design and operation of the next generation of AUVs.Southampton. This 400 m long by 9 m deep dock, immediately adjacent to the Autosub
laboratory, proved an excellent test facility. On the very first day of operations in the
dock seven surface runs were made to test the heading controller, followed by two dives
to 5 m as a test of the depth controller. The next day twelve sub-surface runs were
completed with the acoustic tracking system also operating. The major problem was
handling the umbilical from a rigid inflatable chase boat.
More elaborate test missions were performed during two campaigns in Portland
Harbour (July and November 1996) and one at Oban (April 1997). In all, 88 test missions
during these campaigns exercised a number of different vehicle behaviours including:
surface navigation; sub-surface dead-reckoning navigation based on time and on
waypoints; transects at constant depth and at constant altitude; forward and backward
diving; see-saw profiling to pre-set depth and pre-set height above bottom; leaving
harbour autonomously; DGPS surface navigation; and event-driven track changes e.g. on
reaching a pre-set minimum water depth. The overarching objective for these trials was to
establish the robustness of the vehicle and its control systems when carrying out a wide
variety of mission segments representative of those that would be carried out during
subsequent science campaigns.
2.3 Operational procedures and reliability
Planning for the safe return of an AUV begins long before launch. What the user wants
may be at variance with what the more experienced engineer/operator is willing to allow.
The mission plan, jointly formulated by the user and operator, must try to satisfy the user
requirement but must also be within the bounds of a strategy to minimise hazards and
establish a safe, properly considered rendezvous for recovery. Hazards may includeexcessively rough topography during terrain following missions, strong currents, ice,
shipping and fixed structures.
As the scheduled launch time approaches a weather eye must be kept, remembering that
launching in rough weather is generally much easier than recovery. Launching on a
deteriorating weather forecast could be fool hardy. Shortly before launch a predefined
checklist should be completed with no concessions made to non-compliance without very
careful consideration of possible consequences.
Once the mission is started, a short-range acoustic link with the vehicle is monitored to
ensure that the initial stages of the mission are adhered to. If the AUV's behaviour is not
as expected, the support ship may stop tracking. If the behaviour causes concern, the
mission should be aborted and if the problem is not diagnosed and fixed through the radio
modem link, the vehicle should be recovered.
3. Identification and classification of faults
The mission log sheets for Autosub contain details on all of the problems and faults
discovered. The information on these log sheets formed the basis for the list of faults
discussed in this section.
The faults were clustered under thirteen headings. Some faults have multiple entries, for
example, when a ‘Human Error’ gives rise to a ‘Collision with Vessel’. The Pareto plot,
Figure 1, shows that most faults were the result of human error.
Of course, this form of presentation does not show the relative impact of the faults or if
the profile of faults changed over the tremendous range of missions (from 90 s duration
in Empress Dock to 53 hours on the edge of a hurricane off Bermuda). Neither does the
Pareto plot take any account of the changes to the vehicle systems over a 4-year period.vehicle was able to continue on its way without any intervention after mission 239, on
mission 240 it collided with a cliff and became trapped under an overhang.
*
3.3 Impact of faults
Until now, faults have been considered irrespective of their impact on the operational
performance of the vehicle. While some faults may make no significant impact (e.g.
omission of the 'surface' command at the end of mission 121) others could lead to the loss
of the vehicle (e.g. collision, major pressure vessel leak, battery short circuit). In between
these two extremes lies a spectrum of the impact of a fault on the operational
performance of the AUV. Table 2 splits the impact of faults into twelve categories and
shows the number of arisings in each category for the six mission groups A to F. Some
faults lead to more than one entry in the impact table, e.g. a mission abort also leads to a
direct cost (the loss of the mission abort weight) and a minor delay. It could also mean
that the mission objectives were not met, or were only met in part. There is no evidence
that the fewer faults in mission groups D and E were more serious than in earlier groups.
From Table 2 we see that 26 faults were classified as High Impact. These 26 faults
occurred on 19 different missions. On the past track record, therefore, the probability of a
mission suffering one or more high impact faults was 19/240 or 0.079. Of these 19
missions, the faults on eight occurred either on deployment, during pre-dive checks or on
the first dive. On eleven missions the faults occurred when the vehicle was underway.
Therefore, the probability of a High Impact fault occurring when underway was 0.046 or
once every 22 missions.
                                                   
* The vehicle was later recovered using an ROV.3.4 Building a statistical model of Autosub faults
By fitting parametric models of reliability to Autosub fault data it is possible to produce
formulae that can be used to predict the probability of a fault occurring on any mission in
terms of distance travelled and the operating regime (for example, either mid-water or
terrain-following).
For each Autosub mission the data consists of the distance travelled, the time taken
(although this was not used in the analysis) and whether a fault developed on the mission.
Those that did not have faults were important, as they comprised the vast majority of
missions and provide information about failures. Although not as useful as the actual
distance to failure, such information is valuable particular for the longer distances. The
missions were divided into the same six groups discussed earlier and were analysed by
group and as a whole.
Parametric models of reliability use censored
* and uncensored data to fit a probability
distribution and use this to estimate the probability of a fault occurring over any distance
[11]. Six different distributions were fitted to the data: extreme value, normal, logistic
and their logarithmic versions: Weibull, log normal and loglogistic. It was clear that the
log distributions fitted the data much better than their linear counterparts. The Weibull
distribution showed the highest failure rate, and, to err on the conservative, was chosen as
the preferred parametric model.
There are two important functions that can be calculated from a parametric model of
survival. One is the distribution function. This is the probability that there will have been
                                                   
* A censored observation is one where the mission ended without a fault developing.to 0.35, a 13% reduction in risk for a penalty of monitoring the vehicle for 7% of its
track. In practice, the reduction in risk comes from the opportunity to recall the vehicle if
a fault develops while it is being tracked. This requires the vehicle to telemeter enough
information to the support ship for a decision on whether the vehicle is carrying out its
mission correctly. Achieving the reduction in risk also assumes that the vehicle can be
recalled and that it can be recovered.
4. Survivability analysis
Losing an AUV in the open ocean is a rare event. Most vehicles have visual, radio, sonar
and satellite tracking systems that enable the operator to find a vehicle if it is lost on the
surface or trapped subsurface. For the vast majority of faults, the emergency abort system
senses problems and takes appropriate action. As a consequence, for open ocean work,
the main interest is in the statistics of faults, not losses. However, for a vehicle operating
in ice-covered waters, or in other inaccessible places, the probability of loss becomes
important.
In this section we develop the concept of the probability of losing a vehicle when
operating in an ocean with a rigid lid. That is, with the vehicle working in an operating
environment where there is no method of recovery should it fail to complete its mission.
Such an environment could be under sea ice or under shelf ice.
4.1 Survival probability in an ocean with a rigid lid
First, the survival probability is derived using the simplest statistical model based on a
constant probability of loss per mission, independent of mission length. This is clearly an
oversimplification, given the analysis in section 3.4, nevertheless it is instructive. Second,
the survival probability is derived using a hazard rate varying with distance based on the
parameters of a Weibull distribution.from the 'All missions' fault hazard rate. The implication is that the faults leading to loss
were not a random sub-sample of the population of all faults, but had a different
statistical distribution. With b>1 the loss hazard rate increased with distance travelled,
contrary to the all missions fault hazard rate. Further analysis showed that the increasing
loss hazard rate with distance arose because two of the seven missions considered were
long (at mission 239 at 170 km and mission 240 at 50 km). On both of these missions the
vehicle collided with the seabed when following the terrain.
While it would be appropriate to use these values of a and b to predict the probability
of survival during terrain-following missions, it would be inappropriate to include the
faults during missions 239 and 240 when predicting the probability of survival for mid-
water missions. Taking these two missions out of group L7, to form group L5, results in
a=588.8 and b=1.0065 and a hazard rate almost constant with distance, Figure 4.
In January and February 2001 Autosub undertook a science campaign in the Weddell
Sea, which included a number of missions under sea ice and under icebergs. The
statistical model derived above was used to estimate the likelihood of survival. For these
missions the water depth was well in excess of 1000 m and the vehicle was not following
the terrain. The most appropriate parameters for a Weibull distribution are therefore those
of group L5 (a=588.8 and b=1.0065). Six of the Weddell Sea missions involved transects
under sea ice and four were under icebergs. Table 4 lists the distance travelled under ice
for each of these missions, together with the probability of survival calculated by
multiplying the distance travelled under ice by the hazard rate appertaining to that
distance. The probability of the vehicle surviving the campaign was simply the product of
the probability of surviving each mission. The predicted probability of surviving thelong missions under polar ice shelves from 2002-2004. A full fault effect analysis could
help remove the subjective assessment of the faults that could lead to loss, but a fully
objective analysis scheme is unlikely, there will remain the need for informed
engineering judgement. Another complicating factor is that Autosub is a working
prototype. Its configuration is not always stable. It is altered to suit the user needs on each
campaign. Changes to systems, or adding new systems, have had the effect of temporarily
reducing the reliability.
Future AUV designs should bear in mind the proven reliability of many of the sub-
systems, including the mission controller and the distributed network nodes; the
propulsion motor; the actuators and control surfaces and the relocation aids. Wherever
possible, human actions should be independently checked, for example by simulation.
This is especially important in planning missions and in setting vehicle behaviours. New
sub-systems should be thoroughly tested before they need to be part of the operational
vehicle. All of these are merely examples of good engineering practice. Autonomy in the
open ocean is not overly risky; after all, the main risks, and most faults, happen on or
before launch or on or after recovery.
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